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This paper examines the level of intellectual capital (IC) performance of listed banks in 
Arab Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries using VAIC methodology and 
investigates the hypothesised impact of several corporate governance variables, bank 
specific characteristics and banking industry characteristics on IC performance. We 
extend previous research on determinants of IC performance by considering domestic 
and foreign strategic institutional ownership, bank specific characteristics and banking 
industry characteristics. Our findings show that board size, number of independent 
directors, family ownership and domestic strategic institutional ownership have 
significant relationship with IC performance. In addition, our study provides evidence 
that except for bank internationality, bank specific characteristics and banking industry 
characteristics play important roles in determining IC performance among GCC banks.  
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With the advent of knowledge-based economy, intellectual capital (IC), rather 
than physical and financial capital becomes the main factor in driving firm value 
and sustaining its competitive advantage. This is particularly so in knowledge 
intensive industries such as the banking industry, as its key resources are 
intangible and intellectual in nature (Shih, Chang, & Lin, 2010). Intellectual 
capital, which includes human capital and structural capital, is one of the 
significant assets in the banking industry (Kamath, 2007; Goh, 2005). According 
to Goh (2005), banks depend crucially on the physical capital to operate, but the 
quality of services and products they provide to their customers depend 
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eventually on IC. Until now, there has been no generally accepted definition or 
classification of intellectual capital (Zeghal & Maaloul, 2010). However, the 
definitions of intellectual capital given by researchers are not significantly 
different (Tayles, Pike, & Sofian, 2007). For the purpose of this study and 
consistent with previous studies such as Williams (2001) and Ho and Williams 
(2003), the definition derived by the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) is used. The OECD (2000) defines IC as the 
''economic value of two categories of intangible assets of a firm: (1) 
organisational (structural) capital; and (2) human capital.''  This definition is 
consistent with the value added intellectual coefficient (VAIC) methodology used 
in this study to measure IC performance. 
 
Empirical research on the determinants of IC performance using VAIC 
method dates back to the work by Williams (2001), with two streams of 
subsequent studies documenting the impact of corporate governance and firm 
characteristics on IC performance. However, empirical research to date has 
focused on the  matured capital  markets such as those of the U.K., Sweden and 
Australia (Joshi, Cahill, & Sidhu, 2010; El-Bannany, 2008; Ho & Williams, 
2003) and emerging markets such as Malaysia (Abidin, Kamal, & Jusoff, 2009; 
Saleh, Abdul Rahman, & Hassan, 2009) and South Africa (Swartz & Firer, 
2005). As far as we are concerned, no study has been conducted in GCC 
countries (comprising of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Arab 
Emirates) regarding IC performance and its determinants.  
 
The GCC countries share some common economic, cultural, and political 
similarities, which by far outweigh any differences they might have (Al- 
Muharrami & Matthews, 2009). Collectively, GCC countries have a mature, 
efficient, stable and profitable banking system. In most of the GCC countries, the 
banking sector is the second highest contributor of the countries' GDP after the 
oil and gas sector (Al-Obaidan, 2008). Thus, employing appropriate economic 
and financial policies to improve the efficiency of the banking sector is the prime 
objective of the GCC countries, in which they plan to transform their economies 
into international financial and trade centers (Al-Obaidan, 2008). Since IC 
becomes the essential resource of banks' success (Kamath, 2007; Goh, 2005), 
GCC banks have been required to leverage their knowledge or IC, internally and 
externally. By doing so, banks would be ready to face challenges of globalisation, 
intensive competition, barriers for foreign bank entry and increased demand by 
customers for sophisticated and innovative products and services (Al-Obaidan, 
2008).  
 
Accordingly, motivated by the need to address the determinants of IC 
performance of GCC banks, this paper aims to examine the influence of corporate 
governance (board size, number of independent directors, government ownership, 
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family ownership, domestic strategic institutional ownership, and foreign 
strategic institutional ownership), bank specific characteristics (bank 
internationality, bank adherence to Islamic shariah principles, and bank 
riskiness), and banking industry characteristics (banking industry concentration 
and presence of foreign banks) on IC performance. Our focus is on GCC listed 
banks during the period 2008 to 2010. 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
Board of Directors 
 
The board of directors is an important tool to create, develop, leverage, and 
manage IC of a firm and thus, affect its performance (e.g. Abidin et al., 2009; Ho 
& Williams, 2003). According to Williams (2001), boards of directors can 
structure relevant strategies and policies on how to obtain and best utilise the 
required resources underlying IC. Williams (2001) argues that a firm`s board of 
directors can influence the formation of IC related strategies and policies and 
ultimately performance. However, there are limited studies that investigate the 
relationship between board of directors and IC performance (see Abidin et al., 
2009; Ho & Williams, 2003; Williams, 2001). Moreover, the results of these 




According to resource dependency theory, larger boards are more likely to 
include a large pool of experts with diverse industrial and educational 
backgrounds, and skills that enhance boards' information processing capabilities. 
This can mitigate individual directors' deficiencies in business skills through 
collective decision makings, which in turn improves the quality of strategic 
decisions and actions made by a firm (Abeysekera, 2010; Dalton, Daily, Johnson, 
& Ellstrand, 1999). Furthermore, it is argued that larger boards are more likely to 
increase firms' ability to obtain and secure critical resources from their 
environment such as IC resources (Abeysekera, 2010), assisting in developing 
better interlocking relationships between the firm and its external stakeholder 
groups and enhancing its legitimacy and image in society (Zahra & Pearce, 
1989). Thus, we hypothesise the following: 
 
H1:   There is a positive relationship between board size and bank IC 
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Presence of independent directors 
 
From resource dependency perspective, independent directors provide more 
resources, information, and legitimacy to a firm leading to improved quality 
managerial decisions and firm performance (Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold, 
2000). Independent directors are more likely than inside directors to oppose a 
narrow definition of organisational performance, which focuses primarily on 
financial measures. In addition, independent directors are more likely to support 
managerial long-term oriented decisions that enhance firm long-term 
performance (Ibrahim, Howard, & Angelidis, 2003). Hence, it is expected that 
independent directors are more likely to support IC-related strategies such as 
investing in human resources, R&D activities and information technology. 
Consequently, IC performance will be enhanced. Thus, the following hypothesis 
is proposed: 
 
H2:  There is a positive relationship between the presence of independent 




Ownership structure is another main mechanism of corporate governance that can 
play an important role in developing IC performance or otherwise (Saleh et al., 
2009; Keenan & Aggestam, 2001).  In contrast to banks in developed countries, 
GCC banks are characterised as having concentrated ownership and a large set of 
blockholders who are related to different degrees of risk aversion and resource 




Governments of GCC countries have a significant stake of ownership in most of 
the banks (Chahine, 2007; Al-Hassan, Khamis, & Oulidi, 2010). Theoretically, 
there are two reasons as to why government ownership is detrimental to firm 
performance. First, governments are likely to pay special attention to political and 
social goals such as low output prices, employment or external effects which may 
lead to politicising resource allocation process, and thus reduce the efficiency and 
value of firms (Najid & Abdul Rahman, 2011). Second, the government is not the 
ultimate owner, but the agent of the real owners, the citizen. A large number of 
owners would delegate their monitoring role to politicians and bureaucrats who 
may not actively monitor firms due to their lack of personal interest at ensuring 
that an organisation is run efficiently (Ab Razak, Ahmad, & Aliahmed, 2008). 
These two disadvantages of government ownership can detriment banks 
performance in terms of IC. Saleh et al. (2009) further state that government 
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ownership may negatively influence human capital performance of a firm 
through the appointment of less experienced staff for political or social goals.  
 
Based on the above discussion, we propose the following hypothesis: 
 
H3: There is a negative relationship between government o  




Family ownership is a unique feature of GCC banks (Chahine, 2007; Al-Hassan 
et al., 2010). It is argued that family ownership suffers from significant 
drawbacks arising from possible severe managerial entrenchment and agency 
problems (Saleh et al., 2009; Braun & Sharma, 2007). Family owners may 
choose to appoint company executives from family members. They may also 
exhibit a preference for risk reduction and preservation of firm capital, and 
extract benefits from the firm at the expense of minority shareholders (Braun & 
Sharma, 2007). All these significant drawbacks arising from family ownership 
may detriment IC performance.  
 
Saleh et al. (2009) argue that family owners are more concerned in 
extracting wealth for their private benefits at the expense of minority 
shareholders, avoiding long-term investments such as investing in IC resources. 
According to Fernandez and Nieto (2006), the conservative nature of family 
ownership limits family firms' ability to acquire knowledge-based assets such as 
technologies, well-known brands or qualified employees.  
 
Further, managers in family-owned companies tend to face cognitive 
conflicts in maintaining professional relationships versus family relationships 
since family firms often tend to appoint family members in key managerial 
positions at the expense of hiring professional and qualified employees (Chen & 
Hsu, 2009). This will in turn lead to reduced human capital performance.  
Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis: 
 
H4: There is a negative relationship between family ownership and bank 
IC performance. 
 
Domestic and foreign strategic institutional ownership  
 
Strategic institutional shareholders are long-term investors with long-term 
commitments towards the firm in which they invest in. The contribution of 
strategic institutional shareholders to their investee-firms typically goes beyond 
financial contributions and extends to provision of non-financial resources such 
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as managerial expertise and technical collaborations (Chahine & Tohme, 2009; 
Douma, George, & Kabir, 2006). Therefore, we expect that such type of 
institutional shareholders will be more willing to invest in risky projects such as 
those related to IC because of their incentive to increase firm value and ensure its 
future viability.  
 
However, it is argued that the role of strategic institutional shareholders 
may differ according to their nationality (Chahine & Tohme, 2009; Douma et al., 
2006). From resource-based perspective, nationality of shareholders can be 
regarded as a source of sustained competitive advantage (Chahine, 2007; Douma 
et al., 2006). This issue is quite conceivable, particularly in Arab countries where 
foreign institutional shareholders are more likely to outperform their domestic 
counterparts in terms of experience, organisational, monitoring and technological 
capabilities, and credibility (Chahine & Tohme, 2009). Therefore, this study 
expects that given the heterogeneity in resources and organisational capabilities 
between domestic and foreign strategic shareholders, they will have different 
impact on IC performance. 
 
Therefore, based on the above arguments above, we hypothesise the 
following: 
 
H5a: There is a positive relationship between domestic strategic 
institutional ownership and bank IC performance. 
 
H5b:  There is a positive relationship between foreign strategic 
institutional ownership and bank IC performance. 
 
H5c: The positive association of foreign strategic ownership is 
significantly higher than the positive association of domestic 
strategic institutional ownership. 
 




From the organisational learning theory perspective, firms that enter foreign 
markets can enhance the learning of new skills and capabilities that significantly 
improve a firm's ability to innovate, take risk, and develop new revenue streams 
(Zahra & Hyton, 2008). The interaction between parent firms and their branches 
or subsidiaries in international markets permit the former to expose themselves to 
different systems of innovation, diverse ideas, and multiple cultural perspectives. 
This will enhance firms' ability to learn and acquire new knowledge and skills, 
which in turn improves the current capabilities of firms and increases its stock of 
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knowledge or IC (Zahra, Ireland, & Hitt, 2000; Zahra & Hyton, 2008).                         
The newly acquired knowledge and skills can manifest itself in upgrading and 
promote firms' innovation (Zahra & Hyton, 2008). It is further argued that setting 
up of branches in developed countries helps banks in less developed countries to 
learn advanced skills and experience which will improve the level of 
management (Zhang, 2008). Thus, we hypothesise as follows: 
 
H7: There is a positive relationship between bank internationality and 
bank IC performance. 
 
Bank adherence to Islamic Shariah principles 
 
In GCC countries, Islamic banks and conventional banks operate side by side. 
Islamic banks operate based on Islamic Shariah principles. From the Islamic 
point of view, Islamic banks are based on more moral and ethical principles that 
are adherent to the Islamic religion than conventional banks (Ajmi, Hussain, & 
Al-Saleh, 2009). We argue that the adherence to Islamic Shariah principles 
related to banking transactions (muamalat banking) by GCC banks can inevitably 
enhance the likelihood of IC performance for both human capital and customer 
capital that, in combination, constitute the most important components of IC in 
banks. This is the case because, based their religious beliefs, Muslims view 
banking transactions that are in line with Islamic Shariah principles as part of 
their ethical principles. Consistent with this theoretical argument, previous 
empirical literature evidences that employees and customers are concerned about 
the ethical issues of the companies they deal with. In support for this, several 
studies have shown that as employees and customers assess a company's ethical 
conduct, their level of satisfaction and loyalty to the company increase 
(Valenzuela, Mulki, & Jaramillo, 2009). Based on the above arguments, the 
following hypothesis is proposed: 
 
H8: There is a positive relationship between banks' adherence to 




The banking industry is described as the most risky industry because banks are 
highly leveraged when compared to other industrial firms. This study argues that 
there are several reasons to believe that bank riskiness can influence negatively 
bank IC performance. By exposing to high risks, banks are more likely to be 
under strict monitoring by supervisory agencies (Pathan, 2009). According to 
Pathan (2009), in the presence of continued and close monitoring by regulators, 
bank managers and directors act more conservatively to avoid any lawsuits. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that spending on long-term projects such as 
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R&D projects, employees' training programs, and information technology will 
reduce because of the restrictions on risky investments. Consequently, the ability 
of banks to generate new ideas and innovative services and products will be 
limited, leading to reduced IC performance.  
 
From the market discipline perspective, the perception that an 
organisation is unsafe and exposed to high level of risks can create doubts in the 
minds of its partners and customers that will switch potential businesses 
elsewhere (Ross, 2005). As a result of losing depositors` confidence, it is 
reasonable to expect that relationships with customers will damage, customer 
loyalty will erode, and bank reputation will destroy, leading to negative effects on 
bank IC performance.  
 
From the above arguments, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
 
H9: There is a negative relationship between bank risk and bank IC    
performance. 
 
Banking Industry Characteristics 
 
Banking industry concentration 
 
The banking industry in GCC countries is relatively concentrated with a few 
domestic players dominating the market (Al-Hassan et al., 2010). The efficient 
structure (ES) hypothesis argues that the degree of market concentration should 
be considered a consequence of the superior efficiency of bank firms. 
Consequently, banks that operate more efficiently may adopt internal and/or 
external growth strategies. Therefore, the most efficient banks may gain market 
share and may be the driving force behind the process of market concentration.  
 
Based on efficient structure hypothesis, it is argued that efficient banks 
(i.e. those with superior management and production technologies that translate 
into higher profits) are more likely to focus on enhancing efficiency of value 
creation activities such as IC performance. This is achieved by engaging more in 
social responsibility programs that enhance firm reputation and satisfy 
stakeholders` expectations (Hammond & Slocum, 1996). Consequently, banks` 
relational capital performance could be enhanced. In terms of human resources, it 
is argued that monopolists have more resources that help them to hire the most 
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Based on the above discussion, we propose the following hypothesis: 
 
H10: There is a positive relationship between banking industry                    
concentration and bank IC performance. 
 
Presence of foreign banks 
 
Theoretically, it is argued that the presence of foreign banks leads to improved 
performance of domestic banks through spillovers of knowledge from foreign 
banks to domestic banks (Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt, & Huizinga, 2001; 
Goldberg, 2004). The knowledge spillover from foreign banks to domestic banks 
in terms of new and advanced technologies, processes, and managerial skills can 
lead to improved IC performance of domestic banks through enhanced 
employees' productivity (human capital), improved quality of customer offerings 
(customer capital), and improved banks' routines and processes (organisational 
capital). In addition to knowledge spillover, this study argues that the competitive 
pressures from foreign banks may force domestic banks to focus on improving its 
IC performance through increasing investments in resources underlying IC such 
as human resources development, technology and R&D expenditures. This 
argument is consistent with “quiet life" hypothesis, which argues that the increase 
in competitive pressures due to the presence of foreign banks may force the 
managers of domestic bank to give up their sheltered "quiet life" and use 
resources more efficiently and adopt new technologies to maintain their market 
shares (Berger & Hannan, 1998).  
 
Thus, based on the discussion above, we  hypothesise the following: 
 
H11:  There is a positive relationship between the presence of foreign 







The population comprises of all listed banks in GCC countries during the period 
2008–2010. The dataset consists of 74 GCC listed banks. However, all Kuwaiti 
listed banks (11 banks) and several banks in other GCC countries are excluded 
from the sample due to missing relevant information. The final sample consists of 
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We measure IC performance by using value added intellectual coefficient 
(VAIC) method developed by Pulic (1998). The instrument is widely used in 
studies of IC performance (see Ku Ismail & Abdul Karem, 2011; Goh, 2005; Ho 
& Williams, 2003). Algebraically, VAIC is expressed as follows:  
 
               VAIC = CEE + HCE + SCE                                       (1) 
 
where, (i) CEE is an indicator of Value Added efficiency of capital employed 
(CEE=VA/CE); CE  = (book value of  total assets) - (intangible assets) = 
(financial assets) + (physical assets), (ii) HCE is an indicator of Value Added 
efficiency of human capital (HCE=VA/HC); HC = total salaries and wages, and 
(iii) SCE is an indicator of Value Added efficiency of structural capital 
(SCE=SC/VA), SC= VA – HC = (value added) - (total salaries & wages). IC 
efficiency (ICE) is the sum of human capital efficiency (HCE) and structural 
capital efficiency (SCE). Total VA is calculated as follows: 
 
     VA = OP + EC + D +A                                            (2) 
 
where, OP = Operating Profit; EC = Total Employee Expenses; D = 




Board size is the number of directors on the board. We measure board 
independence by the number of independent directors on the board (Abeysekera, 
2010). Government ownership is measured as a percentage of the ordinary shares 
held by the government. Family ownership is measured as a percentage of the 
ordinary shares held by the family. Strategic institutional ownership is defined as 
the ownership of corporations and other investors from related industry in the 
firm (Chahine & Tohme, 2009, Chahine, 2007; Douma et al., 2006). Following 
Chahine (2007), banks and financial institutions that hold shares in banks are 
classified as strategic shareholders. Domestic (foreign) strategic institutional 
ownership is measured as the sum of the ordinary shares held by the domestic 
(foreign) banks and financial institutions that hold 5% or more shares in the bank. 
Bank internationality is a dummy variable, scoring 1 if the bank has at least one 
foreign subsidiary and 0, otherwise. The adherence to Islamic Shariah principles 
is measured using a dummy variable. The bank will be perceived as adherence to 
Islamic Shariah principles if it is an Islamic bank giving the value 1, and 0 
otherwise. Following previous studies such as Laeven and Levine (2009), bank 
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risk is calculated by a Z-score = (Return on assets + capital asset ratio) divided by 
the standard deviation of return on assets. Following Al-Muharrami and 
Matthews (2009), banking industry concentration is measured by using k-bank 
concentration ratio (CR3) which is based on summing only the market shares of 
the three largest banks in the total assets of the banking market. The presence of 
foreign banks is measured as the ratio of the number of foreign banks to the total 




We control for other determinants of IC performance identified in the existing 
literature, that is bank size and financial performance, measured by the natural 




We employ pooled ordinary least square (OLS) regression to examine the 
relationship between independent variables and IC performance, represented by 
the structural equation as follows: 
 
ICP =  α + β1BOSIZE + β2INDD+ β3GOV + β4FAM + 
β5DSIOW+ β6FSIOW + β7INTN++ β8ADH+ β9RISK 
+ β10CONC + β11FRBK+ β12BASIZE + β13ROE + ε, 
 
where,  
ICP = intellectual capital performance;  
BOSIZE = board size;  
INDD = board independence;  
GOV = governmental ownership,  
FAM = family ownership,  
DSIOW = domestic strategic institutional ownership,  
FSIOW = foreign strategic institutional ownership,  
INTN= bank internationality,  
ADH = adherence to Islamic Shariah principles,  
RISK = bank riskiness,  
CONC = banking industry concentration,  
FRBK = presence of foreign banks,  
BASIZE = bank size;  
ROE = return on equity; and  
ε = error term. 
 
This study undertook normality, linearity, homogeneity and 
multicollinearity tests1 to ensure the quality of data and variables. We also 
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conducted the sensitivity analysis of the basic model using two alternative 
measures of board size (the natural logarithm of the total number of board 
members, and a dummy variable, scoring 1 if the board size is greater than the 
median and 0, otherwise), as well as two alternative measures of board 
independence (a natural logarithm of the number of independent directors, and a 





Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables. Intellectual capital 
performance (VAIC) varies from –4.28 to 12.10 with a mean of 4.20. The mean 
score is consistent with those reported by Al-Musalli and Ku Ismail (2011) 
among United Arab Emirates domestic listed banks (score of 4.4) for the same 
period (2008–2010) and Abdul Salam et al. (2011) among Kuwaiti banks (score 
of 4.45) for the pooled data for ten years (1996–2006). The average IC 
performance of the GCC listed banks in this study is lower than those reported by 
El-Bannany (2008) for UK banks (10.80), Goh (2005) for Malaysian banks 




 N Min Max Mean SD 
ICP 128 –4.28 12.10        4.20 2.67 
BOSIZE 128            3            13 9.16 1.9 
INDD 128            1            10 4.78 2.09 
GOV 128 0.00 70.00 18.96 21.53 
FAM 128 0.00 69.98 8.88 13.26 
DSIOW 128 0.00 99.88 21.03 27.40 
FSIOW 128 0.00 49.38 6.73 12.93 
RISK 128 –0.39 2.25 1.25 0.46 
CONC 128 0.24 0.68 0.43 0.14 
PRBK 128 0.15 0.49 0.38 0.12 
BASIZE 128 8.01 10.79 9.86 0.59 
FINPR 128 –0.45 0.36 0.11 0.13 
 
 
The results of the regression analysis of the basic model (Model 1) are 
shown in the second column of Table 2. The regression model is significant                 








Contrary to the prediction of the resource dependency theory and prior findings 
of Abidin et al. (2009) and Ho and Williams (2003), this study finds a high 
significant negative association between board size, presence of independent 
directors and IC performance at 1% of significance level. Thus, both Hypotheses 
1 and 2 are not supported. According to Dwivedi and Jain (2005), larger boards 
may make it difficult for the members to use their knowledge and skills 
effectively due to problems of coordinating the contributions. Another  
explanation  for  the negative  findings  found  in  this  study  may  be  because 
GCC banks, on  average,  do  not  select  their  board  members  optimally. The 
OECD-Hawkamah survey reveals that most of the selected directors in boards of 
GCC banks lack the necessary skills and adequate understanding of the banking 
environment (OECD, 2009) which may lead  to the lack  of  coordination and 
communication that cause decision making problems.  
 
With respect to the presence of independent directors, Mujtaba and 
William (2011) state that the concept of independent directors is relatively new in 
the GCC region and there are challenges associated with the recruitment of 
suitable and truly independent directors on the boards of companies in the GCC 
region. Another explanation for the negative association may be due to the strong 
influence of family owners in GCC banks, especially in appointing independent 
directors. Family owners may nominate independent directors who are less likely 
to challenge the former's interests that do not favour developing IC resources. 
Thus, it seems that the independent directors merely sit on the board to fulfil the 
requirements made by the GCC code of corporate governance, but might not be 




With respect to governmental ownership variable, this study does not find any 
significant association between governmental ownership and IC performance. 
Thus, Hypothesis 3 (H3) is not supported. This finding is similar to that of Saleh 
et al. (2009). A plausible explanation for the insignificant finding between 
government ownership and IC performance is that GCC governments invested in 
GCC banks but allowed control over key aspects of the banks to be retained by 








Mahfoudh Abdul Karem Al-Musalli and Ku Nor Izah Ku Ismail 
Table 2 
Multiple regression results 
 
ICP = α + β1BOSIZE + β2INDD+ β3GOV + β4FAM + β5DSIOW+ β6FSIOW + 
β7INTN+ β8ADH+ β9RISK  
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Regarding family ownership, consistent with expectations and similar to 
prior study by Saleh et al. (2009), this study finds a negative significant 
association between family ownership and IC performance; thus, Hypothesis 4 
(H4) is supported. The result confirms the managerial entrenchment hypothesis, 
which suggests that high family ownership indicates high probability of 
opportunistic behaviour of families in pursuing their objectives at the expense of 
minority shareholders. 
 
  The coefficient for domestic strategic institutional ownership is 
significant at the 10% level. However, the coefficient is negative suggesting there 
is a moderately negative relationship between domestic strategic institutional 
ownership and IC performance. Thus, H5a is not supported. This may be due to 
the fact that most of the GCC banks and financial institutions are government 
and/or family controlled (Chahine, 2007; OECD, 2009) and at present, it appears 
that managers of these institutions do not necessarily  have  the  proper  incentive 
to encourage their counterparts in other GCC banks to invest in resources 
underlying IC. 
 
Surprisingly, foreign strategic institutional ownership has shown 
insignificant impact on IC performance, suggesting that foreign banks and other 
foreign financial institutions do not improve IC performance of GCC banks; thus, 
H5b is not supported. A possible explanation is that the GCC region is regarded 
as risk prone, especially the political risks (Laabas & Abdomoula, 2005). 
Therefore, banks and other financial institutions from developed countries may 
prefer to keep short-term relationships with domestic banks focusing on 
profitability opportunities in GCC domestic markets instead of focusing on 
transfer of knowledge, technology, and new management styles and skills to 
investee-domestic banks. In addition, it has been argued that in situations 
involving low total percentage shares of foreign strategic investors, foreign 
investors have low motivation to introduce advanced technologies, new products, 
and suitable corporate governance mechanisms (Shen et al., 2009) which make 
their impact on IC performance insignificant. 
 
Bank Specific Characteristics 
 
The relationship between bank internationality and IC performance is statistically 
insignificant even at 10%. Thus, Hypothesis 7 (H7) is not supported. This may be 
due to low ability of GCC banks to absorb, internalise and exploit new 
knowledge and skills from foreign markets. Investments in R&D which are 
viewed as the base to build innovative capabilities and acquire, assimilate, and 
creatively exploit new knowledge from foreign operations (Zahra & Hyton, 2008) 
are still extremely low in GCC banks (Jabsheh, 2005). This possibly contributes 
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to the inability of GCC banks to benefit from the advantages of international 
expansion in developed markets to improve IC performance. 
 
Consistent with our expectation, this study finds a positive significant 
association between the adherence to Islamic Shariah principles and IC 
performance at a 1% level. Thus, H8 is supported. The result implies that banks 
that operate in line with the Islamic Shariah principles have higher IC 
performance than those that do not. In respect of the bank riskiness variable, this 
study used the Z-score of each bank to measure bank riskiness. The Z-score is a 
measure of bank stability and indicates the distance from insolvency as defined as 
a state where losses surmount equity (Laeven & Levine, 2009). According to 
Laeven and Levine (2009), Z-score is the inverse of the probability of insolvency. 
Thus, a higher Z-score indicates that the bank is more stable and bank riskiness is 
lower. The coefficient of bank riskiness (i.e. Z-score) is positive and significantly 
associated with IC performance as predicted. Thus Hypothesis 9 (H9) is 
supported.  
 
Banking Industry Characteristics 
 
Our results show that the degree of banking industry concentration has a positive 
effect on the level of IC performance, providing support to efficient structure 
(ES) hypothesis. Thus, Hypothesis 10 (H10) is supported. With respect to the 
presence of foreign banks, interestingly, the results of the regression analysis 
indicate that the presence of foreign banks is negatively associated with IC 
performance at a 1% level. Thus Hypothesis 11 (H11) is not supported. One 
plausible explanation is that GCC banks are not sufficiently competent in 
adapting to the new competitive environment as a result of the presence of 
foreign banks. Foreign banks in GCC countries such as Citigroup and HSBC are 
characterised as having advanced technology, broader product offerings, high-
quality and sophisticated risk management techniques, and qualified human 
capital (Turk-Ariss, 2009). These advantages of foreign banks are likely to 
motivate customers in GCC countries to switch to foreign banks because they are 
more able to meet their needs and demands for superior and innovative products 
and services. This would finally lead to eroding customer base of GCC banks, 
detrimental to their IC (customer capital) performance. Furthermore, in order to 
mitigate information costs of doing businesses in local markets and have a deep 
understanding of local businesses, foreign banks may resort to introduce a higher 
remuneration package and wages than that introduced by domestic banks. This 
would attract the most skilled and qualified local bankers and employees in 









Our findings show that bank size does not influence bank IC performance. This 
finding is however similar to the findings reported by Joshi et al. (2011), of the 
Australian owned banks. As expected and consistent with prior findings by El-
Bannany (2008) and Swartz and Firer (2005), we find a positive significant 




The results of the sensitivity analyses are presented in Table 2 (Models 2–5). 
Models 2 and 3 present the results of using the natural log and the dummy 
variable for board size, respectively. Models 4 and 5 show the results of using the 
natural log and the dummy variable for number of independent directors, 





Our study has several policy implications. First, it may help the banking 
regulators in taking actions towards developing their performance and in turn 
maximising value creation. Second, regulators in GCC countries should revise 
the  request  for  a  minimum  number  (one-third  of  the  board)  of  independent 
directors on the board of GCC banks. This is because independent directors in 
GCC countries in general do not possess the knowledge, skills and expertise in 
banking which may impede board processes and decision-making, and 
consequently IC performance. Otherwise, regulators in GCC countries should 
impose more strict nomination procedures for selecting the true independent 
directors.  
 
The strong negative significant association between the presence of 
foreign banks and IC performance implies that the relaxation of entry barriers 
may not be an adequate solution for the GCC countries. While we hypothesise 
that the presence of foreign banks would help GCC banks improve their IC 
performance through either knowledge spill over or competition enhancement, 
our result shows that the presence of foreign banks deteriorates the IC 





1.  These tests are not reported here to save space, but they are available from the 
authors upon request. 
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